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1Abstract
The USDA has used bidding to  enroll land into the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) and may use similar mechanisms  to implement other
policy instruments  in which some or all agricultural land cropping rights
are acquired to protect or increase environmental amenities.  Experience
with the CRP suggests that current enrollees are being compensated in
excess of the lowest payment they would be willing to  accept in exchange
for loss of cropping rights.  While it may be prohibitively expensive  to
estimate  such reservation prices on all potential CRP parcels,  it is
likewise difficult to design a bidding mechanism that induces  landowners
to reveal these values.
While the competitive bidding and contingent valuation literatures
provide some guidance,  the problem of designing a cost effective bidding
mechanism for land retirement does not conform precisely to  situations  in
which theoretical,  experimental or case study results have been reported.
Despite this,  realistic incremental changes  in the CRP's current bidding
mechanism that  induce competitive behavior among bidders appear  to portend
significant  savings  in government  outlays.
I.  Introduction
Cropland retirement has been used as  an instrument of agricultural
policy since the 1950s  and is  likely to be a fixture of future policy as
long as U.S. agricultural productive capacity is perceived to  exceed
demand.  One current incarnation of this instrument  is  the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP),  in which landowners offer bids  for retiring highly
erodible  land for ten years  in exchange for annual payments.
As concern over the federal budget has increased, those government
programs  (such as the CRP) that involve large public or private
expenditures have been subject to increasing cost effectiveness scrutiny.
While agricultural programs have been relatively immune from such scrutiny
compared to other domestic programs,  their high cost  is  increasing
pressure for making them more cost effective as well.
2This paper focuses on proposed improvements to CRP enrollment
procedures,  particularly on cost-effectiveness  gains achieved by modifying
bidding procedures.  We describe the current CRP bidding mechanism Section
(II)  and estimate potential savings  to  the government if the bidding
mechanism was improved  (III).  We next present an analytic  framework for
evaluating the cost effectiveness of alternative bidding mechanisms  (IV).
In Section V, we summarize the bidding literature relevant  to possible
reform of the CRP.  Then we develop a general land retirement bidding
model  (VI) and discuss several extensions making it more realistic  (VII).
We suggest some  implications of this model to  the CRP  (VIII) and, finally,
suggest directions for future research  (IX).
II.  Current CRP Bidding Mechanism
The Conservation Reserve Program,  authorized under Title XII  of the
1985 Food Security Act  (the farm bill),  is  a hybrid of previous  land
retirement and soil conservation programs, with some novel features.2
Under the CRP, farmers agree not to produce crops on qualifying highly
erodible  (or otherwise eligible) land for ten years,  in exchange  for
annual rental payments.  During announced enrollment periods,  farmers
submit bids to their county USDA Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service (ASCS) office indicating the acreage and annual
payment per acre that they would accept in compensation for retiring the
The CRP has several stated legislative objectives.  (1) Conserve
soil productivity for future generations.  (2) Improve surface and ground
water quality by reducing runoff and use of farm chemicals.  (3) Reduce
environmental damages associated with wind erosion.  (4) Improve wildlife
habitat quantity and quality and increase ecological diversity.  (5)
Provide a guaranteed income supplement to farmers.  (6)  Reduce surplus
crop production.
3land.  The ASCS later announces the Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate  (MARR)
for the multi-county pool  in which the bidder's farm is  located.  All
parcels bid at that level or lower are accepted for enrollment.  The Soil
Conservation Service  (SCS) verifies that the parcel fulfills erodibility
and other requirements and prepares a management plan for permanent
vegetative cover.  Land cover costs can receive 50% government cost-
sharing.
An evaluation of the cost effectiveness implications of changing  the
CRP's current bidding mechanism requires that we first examine  its salient
features.  Of particular importance are the variables that the government
has chosen to induce and to  evaluate bids:  land parcel eligibility
criteria, MARR values,  (often multiple county) bidding pools,  the number
of bidding periods,  county acreage enrollment limits, and national acreage
enrollment goals.  Significantly, the CRP has no stated budget limit at
either the pool or national  levels.
Physical eligibility criteria are intended to ensure  that enrolled
land is  "highly erodible" or  is otherwise environmentally sensitive.
(More recent eligibility criteria include riparian land and cropped
wetlands.)  In this sense,  the purpose of eligibility criteria is to
guarantee a minimum level of conservation benefits from land retirement.
Bidding pool boundaries  are rough proxies for cash rent value
isolines, such that eligible land in each pool is  relatively homogeneous
in terms of value of agricultural production.  The MARR is  a pool-
specific, per-acre amount (loosely based on the 1985 average local cash
rents),  above which bids are not accepted.  Imposing the MARR tends to
limit at the upper end the productivity of land that is retired within a
4given pool.  However, because  the MARR could lead to rejection of a bid in
one pool that might have been accepted in an adjacent pool,  individual
MARRs do not impose  a national  ceiling on the productivity of retired
land.
The  CRP has had multiple bidding rounds of fixed and known length
during which landowners may submit bids.  Given the CRP's novelty and
scope,  it was unlikely that the national acreage enrollment goal would be
met after just one round.  Multiple rounds have given landowners time to
learn about and become accustomed to the program and to observe bid
acceptances  in previous rounds.  This learning allowed landowners to
revise  their bids downward,  if initially rejected, or to enter bids more
likely to be accepted,  even if they did not bid in earlier rounds.  From
the government's perspective,  multiple rounds have spread out the
workload, while allowing the government to modify program provisions to
make bidding more or less  attractive in order to meet the national
enrollment goal.
The 40-45 million acre enrollment goal set by Congress was based upon
estimates of the national acreage of highly erodible land,  as well as  that
amount of land in production that was perceived to result in the  surplus
of agricultural commodities that concerned policymakers at the time the
program was established.  The existence of this statutory enrollment goal
has meant that program success has been largely measured on the basis of
how many acres  are retired, not upon the progress toward stated program
objectives  (Dicks).
Within each county, no more than 25% of the cropland acreage can be
retired.  This provision is  intended to limit adverse effects on the local
5agricultural economy,  especially agricultural input suppliers.  This local
acreage limit has not, it appears, been used overtly to  induce competition
among potential bidders.  As well,  the government has not overtly used
national or local budget limits as control variables;  there  is only an
implicit upper level of government outlays associated with the national
enrollment objective, MARRs,  and county enrollment limits.
Gross CRP outlays which will run into the  tens  of billions of
dollars,  must be arrayed against partially compensating budget savings.
For each acre retired,  a farmer's eligibility to  receive government
commodity program benefits  is  also reduced by some fraction of an acre.
As well,  reduced crop production presumably leads  to increased market
prices, which also reduces necessary government subsidies.  Because  the
attractiveness of CRP participation is affected by other farm program
parameters, commodity program rules can be construed as indirect CRP
control variables.  However, net federal government outlays with the CRP
are still billions more than without the CRP (Young and Osborn).
The decision to bid land into the CRP  is thought to be influenced by
many factors such as  land quality, commodity program participation,  the
proportion of the farm remaining will be affected, age of farmer  (Esseks
and Kraft, 1990).  In addition,  the CRP may be attractive to  risk averse
producers because:  1) annual CRP rent is fixed, 2) CRP entry provides  a
subsidized opportunity to comply with conservation compliance,  3) overall
yield risk is reduced if marginal land is retired,  and 4) there is
opportunity to earn greater off-farm income  (Boggess).  On the other hand,
the CRP  locks farmers  in to a ten year contract; breaking it imposes
penalties.
6The minimum per acre bid level  is determined by the value to  the
farmer of the net returns  that would be foregone by retiring the bidded
parcel.  This opportunity cost or  "reservation price"  is,  in turn,  thought
to vary according to crop yields, relative mobility of factor  inputs,
landowner expectations of future crop prices,  etc.  In later analysis,  we
assume that each landowner knows her reservation price;  however,  the
opportunity costs of foregone crop production over the ten year period are
subject to several  types of uncertainty:
1. optimum production process and other control variables;
2. stochastic processes such as yields,  input and output prices,
interest rates,  and other variables for which probability distributions
can be estimated;
3. government program variables under existing legislation  (but
determined in future)  such as  loan rates, acreage limitations,  target
prices,  etc.;  and
4. future changes in legislation or new legislation that affect the
rules  of the game,  that is,  ease of or returns  to participation in the
future  (Boggess, 1986).
Landowners have had access to numerous sources of information on how
to calculate "breakeven" bids:  articles in farm magazines, extension
bulletins, staff from local government agencies,  etc.,  and, for the first
round of bidding, many farmers undoubtedly availed themselves  of suggested
calculation procedures.  Since the first round, however, the constancy of
the observed MARRS allowed farmers to peg per-acre bids directly to the
local MARR.  As shown in Section IV, the current CRP bidding mechanism has
become tantamount to a fixed "take-it-or-leave-it" offer from the
7government.  This has led some observers  to argue that CRP participants
are being paid "too much" and that the bidding mechanism would be improved
through competition  (GAO,  1989;  Taff and Runge, 1988).
III. Empirical Estimate of Overpayment and Potential Adverse Effects
In this section, we estimate total overpayments from the CRP, as
implemented,  and potential savings from a yet-to-be identified perfectly
incentive-compatible bidding scheme.
The demonstrated increase  in average bid levels and the decrease  in
variation among bids over the several CRP rounds might be explained in
three ways that are not mutually exclusive.  First, bidding might be
working as it  is  supposed to:  low bids are accepted in earlier rounds,
leaving only those farmers with higher reservation prices  remaining to bid
in later rounds.  In this  case,  the observed distribution of bids in each
round perfectly tracks the underlying distribution of reservation prices
of those bidding in that round.  (Since the bid caps were unchanged over
the rounds, we need an appurtenant explanation of why everyone did not bid
in earlier rounds.  Convention assigns  this  to reasons of transaction
costs and strategic behavior.)
A second related explanation might be that bidders' expectations of
future income opportunities to be foregone by land retirement increased
over time,  causing bids to be raised.
A  third explanation for bids converging to the MARR is  that
prospective bidders  (after the first round) learned that any bid no
greater than the bid cap would be accepted and that the bid cap would not
change from previous rounds.  New bidders  and previously unsuccessful
8bidders both learned to peg their bids to the MARR.  Under this
explanation,  the observed distribution of bids  does not accurately reflect
the underlying distribution of reservation prices.  In the following
discussion, we adopt this behavioral explanation of bid convergence.
The  actual changes in CRP bid distributions can be used to
approximate the budget savings that might be achieved by a scheme  that
induces landowners to bid their reservation prices rather than pegging to
the MARR.  In Figure 1, showing a stylized cumulative  distribution of bid
CRP acreage,  the area under the "offer curve",  AOCE, is thus  total
government payments to enroll A acres.  Had each enrollee bid the MARR
instead,  the government would have paid area AODE for the same A acres.
The underlying reservation price distribution shows  that the government
would have had to pay only area AOBF, if landowners had instead bid their
true reservation prices.  The area between the  two curves,  BCEF, is  thus
the potential ex post "savings"  (over the actual performance) achieved by
a perfect preference revelation scheme,  and the area between the offer
curve and the horizontal MARR line,  area CDE, is  the actual savings
achieved by the extant CRP bidding procedures compared to a fixed offer
(at the MARR) scheme.
Of course,  "true" underlying reservation prices are unknown to the
government.  In what follows, we use the bid distribution from the first
round of CRP bids in Minnesota (950 bids,  enrolling 64,589 acres) to
approximate this distribution.  This will be compared against successive
rounds'  offer curves to measure the potential savings achievable by better
bidding systems.  Since even the first round bids are probably above true
reservation prices,  savings estimates, so measured, are understated.  On
9Figure 1:  Hypothetical Relationships Between Ordered
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10the other hand, because later round offer curves may not represent
behavioral changes alone--underlying reservation price distributions
unchanged over time--continued use of the  first round offer curve as a
baseline may lead to an overestimate of bidding savings.
Figure 2 shows the shifts in Minnesota CRP offer curves over the
first 3 rounds of bidding.  (Rounds 4-9 are nearly identical in shape to
the third round).  In order to compare offer curves across rounds and
across the nine Minnesota bidding pools  (each with a different MARR),  the
horizontal axis  shows  the percent of total acres accepted in each round,
and the vertical axis shows the ratio of each bid to  the appropriate
round's MARR in place for the pool  in which the land was located.  Bid
convergence is  demonstrated by the decreasing proportion of bid acres much
below a bid ratio of 1.0.  (The figure shows only those bids that were
accepted.  "Overbids"  (those above the MARR) declined precipitously after
the  first round in Minnesota.)
Bid Savings
Actual CRP bidding savings over a fixed MARR offer (corresponding to
area CDE in Figure 1) can be approximated by summing over all bids the
difference between the appropriate MARR and the accepted bid
(Table 1).  The second column (Fixed MARR) is generated by multiplying the
enrolled acreage by the appropriate MARR, and the third is  the actual  CRP
program expenditure (bid times acreage).  The fourth column is  simply the
difference between the two.  Savings are expressed in thousand dollars and
as a percent of the fixed MARR payment.  For  the reasons discussed above,
savings from bidding declined over the rounds,  from an initial  17.79%  to
11FIGURE 2:  CRP Offers by Bid Ratio,.
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12Table 1:  Actual CRP Bid Savings:  Minnesota:  Rounds 1-9
Annual Payment  (000)
Round  Acres  Fixed MARR  Actual Payment  Savings
dollars  percent
1  64,589  3,778  3,106  672  17.79
2  158,746  8,706  8,040  666  7.65
3  298,734  17,237  16,648  589  3.42
4  671,910  41,243  39,522  1,720  4.17
5  208,573  11,528  11,314  214  1.86
6  128,128  6,806  6,614  192  2.82
7  113,162  6,302  6,071  231  3.67
8  84,234  4,846  4,684  162  3.34
9  102.279  5.825  5.622  203  3.48
TOTAL  1,830,355  106,271  101,622  4,649  4.37
13less  than 5%.  Overall, the actual CRP bidding scheme saved $4.6 million
compared to paying the MARRs  for all accepted bids.
Taking the first round offer curve as  the underlying reservation
price distribution, we can calculate the potential savings had the CRP
bidding scheme worked better.  The $106.3 million sum of the second column
in Table 1 represents  the "worst case,"  a bid system that fails completely
to elicit bids below the cap.  If we apply the  same percentage savings
over the fixed offer that was actually achieved in the first round--
17.79%--to each of the succeeding rounds, we obtain a potential savings of
$18.9 million compared to actual savings of $4.6 million.  This
understates savings from a "perfect" bidding scheme to  the extent that  the
first round offer curve  is not an accurate portrayal of the underlying
reservation price distribution.  Savings are overstated to  the extent that
the underlying distribution itself shifts over the  rounds,  as previous
enrollments altered the set of potential bidders.
This,  then, provides us with an upper and lower bound to  the savings
that might be achieved by a given CRP bidding scheme.  If the Minnesota
numbers are  extrapolated to  the U.S.,  the  33.9 million acres enrolled so
far might have been brought in at $223 million less than their actual
$1.66 billion annual cost.3 The present value of the ten year stream of
the potential $223 million/year savings  is obviously much larger.  The
magnitude of this  "overpayment" convinces us that more careful attention
is  due to schemes that promise to increase government cost effectiveness.
3Using a substantially different procedure, GAO estimated that
competitive bidding would have saved $296 million in the Mountain and
Plain States alone,  through the first seven rounds  (GAO, 1989).
14IV.  Analytical Framework for Evaluating Alternative Bidding Mechanisms
In order to make comparisons between alternative bidding mechanisms,
we first need to specify the "base case" against which other bidding
schemes can be compared.  One option would be a world in which the CRP has
not yet been implemented,  so that potential participants have as  little
information as  they did prior to  the first CRP bidding round.
Alternatively, one could consider a world in which the current CRP exists
and is being extended,  in which case potential participants would know all
about MARRs and about previously successful and successful bid
distributions.  Clearly,  a given scheme might be an improvement relative
to one such base case but not to the  other.  In Sections VI and VII,
alternative bidding schemes will be  evaluated against a base of the first
type,  a world in which the  CRP has not yet been implemented.  In Section
VIII, we adapt these results to provide some policy guidance for the
existing conditions base case as well.
Second, we must specify whether alternative bidding mechanisms are
analyzed in an optimizing framework or by comparison of discrete  outcomes.
While the USDA has both discrete  (generic bidding mechanism) and
continuous (eligibility criteria, MARR) parameters  to choose,  it does not
appear to have been optimizing anything in particular in its
implementation of the CRP to date.  Landowners  (potential bidders),
however, have tended to behave as though maximizing income, subject to  the
known MARR.  In this paper, we analyze a CRP-like policy instrument that
is formulated,  following the literature,  as an optimization problem for
both sides.  Nevertheless, our results provide some policy guidance to  the
current CRP, even in its non-optimizing mode of implementation.
15Third, we need to specify an accounting perspective,  so as to  clarify
the relevant relationships among social costs,  social benefits,  government
payments, bids, MARRs, and reservation prices.  Social benefits  (SBi),  as
used here,  are the  (monetized) environmental conservation benefits
accruing to  society from retiring eligible parcel i.  Social costs  (SCi)
are the societal opportunity costs of not producing crops on the parcel.
Despite the presence of a commodity "surplus,"  SCi may be positive  (Ervin
and Dicks,  1988;  Willis,  et al.,  1988; Kozloff and Taff,  1990).  Two
common tests of whether a program results in a positive net social change
relative to a no-program case are ESBi/SSCi > 1 or, equivalently, ZSBi -
ESCi > 0.  When two  or more discrete programs  (or bidding schemes) are
being compared, however,  the benefit/cost ratio test may give a different
ordering than the net social benefits test.  Regardless of which test is
used,  SBi and SCi are the only relevant parameters  from a social
accounting perspective.  Unfortunately, neither are observable  in CRP
transactions, although might be estimated.
A government accounting perspective is appropriate for an analysis of
the level of program effects in comparison to total government
expenditures.  Unlike the social accounting perspective,  in which
transfers are uncounted, under this perspective monies transferred from
taxpayers  to program participants influence the relative success of one
program option over another.  Program effects may be measured as social
benefits or as constant unmonetized units of service.  In some cases,  the
total  level of service to be provided is predetermined by statute or
rule,  so that program options are compared according to least cost to
achieve  that given level of service.  In other cases,  the service levels
16of two options are  compared while being constrained by the same budget. If
CRP outcomes are measured in acres enrolled (A),  for example,  and
expenditures are direct payments for retirement  (GPi), then two program
alternatives could be compared on the basis  of the ratio SA/EGPi.
From the private accounting perspective,  participants are concerned
with the difference between accepted bids  (BIDi) and reservation prices
(break-even amounts) required in compensation (RPi).  In this sense,  RPi
is  the private opportunity cost of retirement, also unobserved in the CRP
transaction.  Because profit-maximizing farmers will never accept a
smaller government payment than their reservation price,  they will always
submit a bid at BIDi 2 RP .
From both government and private accounting perspectives,  then,
"overpaying" a CRP participant for enrolling parcel i means GPt > RPt.
This  is obviously an unfavorable outcome for the government,  but a
favorable one for participants.  For two bidding schemes with identical
outcomes,  if scheme A favors program participants more than does scheme B,
then A is  less favorable for the government.
Since estimating social benefits of land retirement is beyond the
scope of this paper, we will emphasize the governmental accounting
perspective in comparing alternative bidding mechanisms.  Nevertheless,
choosing the option that minimizes overpayments may also have positive
social welfare effects.  Overpaying farmers  for CRP land retirement may
directly or indirectly affect social welfare in several ways:
1)  The ten year stream of program outlays is greater than it would
otherwise be.  This added claim on the federal budget either exacerbates
the negative macroeconomic effects associated with the federal budget
deficit or increases the distortions associated with taxation.  In terms
17of secondary effects stemming from net changes in national consumption and
investment, the loss of income  to taxpayers may not offset the gain in
income to CRP participants from payments  in excess of reservation prices.
2)  To the extent that overpaying draws more land out of production
than otherwise,  it exerts upward pressure on local land rental rates and
sales prices,  so nonparticipants may have to pay more for land. As a
result, other agricultural inputs, such as  chemicals, may be substituted
for land, reducing net areawide environmental benefits of land retirement.
3)  Should an overall budget constraint ever be imposed in the
future,  overpaying now means  that fewer total  acres, with associated
environmental benefits,  can be enrolled.
4)  Under very restrictive  assumptions, the ordering of program
options using governmental and social accounting perspectives would be the
same.  For this  to obtain,  the ranking of benefit/cost ratios,  ZSBi/ZSC i ,
would have to be the same as,  for example,  the EA/ZGP i ratios.  This would
be true if SBi were a constant and if SCi and GPi were proportionately
related.
V. Results from Bidding Models  in Literature
One way for the government to increase cost effectiveness would be to
estimate  individual parcel reservation prices based on productivity/crop
yields, crop enterprise systems,  and whole farm factors  (Micro-Targeting
Work Group,  1990;  Boggess,  1986).  These data could then be used to drive
representative farm decision models that estimate, among other parameters,
cropland retirement reservation prices.  The government could then make
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"take-it-or-leave it" offers based on estimated reservation prices.
However,  such estimation is complicated by risk and uncertainty faced by
farmers in participation decisions that affect farmers'  own estimates  of
reservation prices  (Boggess, 1986),  as well as  the obvious data costs.
Consequently such a procedure is  likely to be prohibitively expensive if
conducted on all parcels, although it may be feasible for some small
subset of parcels meeting certain physical eligibility criteria.
The difficulties associated with ex ante identification of
reservation prices provide a rationale for developing mechanisms  that
induce participants  to  reveal values that at least approach reservation
prices.  The economic and public policy analysis literature was reviewed
with several questions  in mind:
1)  Which models of bidding mechanisms appear most similar to  the current
CRP?
2)  Do these models generate results that have potential for reducing
total government outlays?
3)  Is  there any evidence that experiments and experience generate
results similar to those predicted by theory?
4)  Have past applications  in real situations actually saved the
government money?
Most of the theoretical and applied literature addressing bidding
mechanisms and auctions5 is  derived from the theory of games with
incomplete information.  There is no lack of reading material:  a 1979
bibliography listed nearly 500 titles on quantitative models of
competitive bidding alone  (Stark and Rothkopf,  1979).  Several authors
4The existence of the CRP's subnational bidding pools  and MARRs
suggests  that reservation prices have been disaggregated to some extent.
5The literature does not make a clear distinction between use of the
terms  "bidding" and "auctions."  We,  too, use them interchangeably.
19have attempted to  categorize bidding models and compare their results
(McAfee and Preston,  1987;  Milgrom, 1989;  several authors in Amihud,  1976;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans,  1980, Milgrom and Weber,  1982).
We follow Engelbrecht-Wiggans  in classifying mechanisms according to
the following components and subcomponents:
1.  Players
a.  Number of participants
b.  Characteristics  of their utility functions
2.  Objects being exchanged
a.  Number
b.  Information about object's value
c.  Distinguishing physical characteristics  (if multiple objects
being exchanged)
d.  Is  the object divisible or  indivisible?
3.  Payoff function
a.  How award is  made to bidder(s)
b.  Price paid
c.  Reservation price  (of seller)
d.  Other transfer costs  such as information or bid preparation
costs
4.  Strategies  of bidders
The large number of permutations of these characteristics,  as  well as  the
unfortunate fact that theoretical results derived for one analyzed bidding
mechanism may apply only to a small class of other mechanisms,  makes it
important  that we precisely specify the CRP's own bidding mechanism.
(1)  With respect to the above classification scheme,  the CRP
involves many potential participants whose number is determined by known
land eligibility criteria.  The utility functions of these participants
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may be quite complicated and nonlinear ;  however,  for present purposes we
treat them as linear  in income.
The government knows  in advance how many acres meet the CRP
eligibility criteria, but  it does not know, because of high information
costs, how many landowners control the eligible lands.  Unfortunately,
auctions with a variable number of players have received considerably less
theoretical attention than those with a fixed, known, number of bidders
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980).  In some models,  the number of players  is
determined by the bid-taker's reserve price  (here the MARR) and an entry
fee  (here undetermined transaction cost factors)  (Milgrom and Weber,
1982).
(2)  A fundamental characteristic of the CRP is  that multiple objects
(different size parcels offered by different owners,  some or all of which
will be accepted) are being exchanged.  Unfortunately, multi-object
auctions have received far less attention in the literature than single-
object auctions, and the models  studied tend to be quite specialized
(Weber, 1983).  The multiple objects being exchanged can be considered the
cropping rights to specified parcels  for ten years.  Their number is
random, but  is bounded above by the total number of eligible acres  divided
by the minimum parcel size.  The objects' values are not known with
certainty by anyone.  They differ both because their physical
characteristics are different and because an object's marginal value to a
6For example,  the CRP reservation price is  sensitive to the number of
acres bid because of the immobility of certain factors of production such
as machinery (Johnson and Clark, 1989).
21bidder may vary with parcel acreage.  The objects are divisible  (number
of acres  in a parcel) up to  a point.
(3)  The payoff function is  to pay each of the successful bidders  the
value of their bids.  The bidders have minimum reservation prices that
represent foregone opportunities, and the bid-taker has a maximum payment
level  (the MARR).
(4)  A bidding strategy is a decision rule that specifies how a
player will use any information observed to determine  the actual bid.  In
most multiple-bidder models,  Nash equilibrium strategies  are sought  in
which each player maximizes expected utility, given the strategies used by
other players.  Such behavior does not need to be postulated for the
current CRP, however, because there  is no binding constraint (other than
the  25%  county maximum in certain rare circumstances).  We show in a later
section how the CRP might be adapted to a strategic game,  following
imposition of binding constraints.
Although the CRP's characteristics  do not conform exactly to any
model found in the literature,  it approximates certain multiple-object
sealed bid forms,  such as U.S Treasury Bill auctions (Weber, 1983).  Two
differences  are that the number of objects  (the dollar value of the  issue)
being exchanged in T-bill auctions is  fixed, and most multiple-object
auctions allow players to bid on more than one object.
These and other differences make it difficult to  apply existing
models to  the CRP cost-effectiveness problem.  Auction models are seldom
analyzed for their robustness,  and many require certain parameters or
probability distributions to be determined empirically  (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans,  1980).  Because theoretical results may not be robust to  small
22deviations or inaccuracies  in determining parameters, applying derived
results to the CRP must be done with caution.  For example,  in a single
object auction,  the value of the winning bid converges asymptotically to
the  true value of the object as  the number of bidders becomes sufficiently
large  (Wilson, 1977).  However, share auctions  (in which bids are for a
fractional share of an object) such as  that for T-bills  (and for the  CRP)
can lead to  less revenue  (greater outlays)  than unit auctions because they
are subject to manipulation by bidders.  The bid-taker  (the government)
may receive no benefit from competition as the number of bidders increases
(Wilson, 1979).
In addition, single-object forms  tend to have more easily defined
solution concepts.  Some forms of multiple-object auctions  (especially
when bidders may submit bids  for more than one object) may not have any
Nash equilibria,  or the Nash equilibria may not be unique.  In such cases,
alternative solution concepts must be used  (Palfrey, 1980).  With multi-
object auctions  in which there are qualitative differences among the
objects,  it  is not even clear that there  is a definable algorithm for an
optimal solution (Vickrey, 1976).
In single object auction models, a standard result is  that closed and
open forms yield identical expected outcomes  (revenues or outlays)
(Milgrom and Weber,  1982).  When multiple objects,  such as CRP land
parcels,  are auctioned,  the situation is more complicated.  Multiple
object open bid auctions  typically announce winners for each object during
the bidding period.  With the CRP, the government announces accepted bids
only after the round closes.  Potential bidders observe a sequence  of bids
whose range may bracket their own reservation prices.  Information about
23previously submitted bids may affect subsequent bids.  Early bidders might
initially understate true reservation prices  in hopes  of lowering others'
bids and then resubmit a higher level as  the bidding period draws to a
close.  Such deception strategies  are discussed by Hausch (1986).
The existence of the MARR also makes  it difficult to  apply results
from other models to the  CRP.  In single object auctions, when the bid-
taker (the government)  announces a maximum acceptable bid,  expected
outlays are reduced (Milgrom and Weber,  1982).  Under some conditions,
however, any decrease  in the expected number of bidders  increases the bid-
taker's total payments more than the  decrease in total payments due  to  the
lower maximum acceptable bid (Engelbrecht-Wiggans,  1987).
The  CRP's multiple rounds  of bidding may also complicate  the
analysis.  If there are positive opportunity costs to the bid-taker for
waiting for additional bids  (either from those previously rejected or  from
new bidders),  then it may be better for the bid taker to accept any bid
that is  lower than some specified amount and to  reject all others.  The
problem for the bid-taker is  to specify the best stopping rule,  or cut-off
level.  This problem becomes more complicated if the bidding distribution
changes over time in response to dynamic aspects of the economy  (McCall,
1976).
Has competition saved the government money (or increased its
revenues)?  Empirical results are sketchy, but appear mixed.  The
question,  "Compared to what?" makes  this type of analysis difficult.
Moody and Kruvant (1990) concluded that for Outer Continental Shelf
leases,  a change  in policy that reduced the number of bids per tract  (less
competition) lowered government revenues.  Studies of defense procurement,
24however,  show mixed results in terms of government savings  (Anton and Yao,
1990;  Yuspeh,  1976;  Vartabedian, 1990).
VI.  Characterization of a CRP-like Bidding Mechanism
In this section, we present a model of a CRP-like policy instrument
that incorporates a competitive bidding mechanism.  The model faithfully
captures the CRP's essential features:  landowners voluntarily submit bids
to receive annual payments  for retiring eligible parcels and asymmetry
exists between the government's and landowners' knowledge of individual
reservation prices.
To facilitate analysis,  the land retirement policy instrument posited
abstracts somewhat from the  real CRP.  The simplifying assumptions used
(some of which are relaxed later) are as follows:
1)  The numbers  of eligible acres and the  smaller number of acres  to be
enrolled are exogenously determined by the government prior to bidding.
2)  Social benefits from land retirement are constant among all eligible
acres and society derives constant marginal utility from land retirement,
within the range of eligible acres.  Social costs do not enter directly
into the government's problem.  Thus,  the government is  concerned only
about achieving its acreage goal for the least expenditure.
3)  There is but one round of bidding.
4)  Each owner of eligible land has exactly one acre of land to bid in to
the program.  The total acreage  for which bids are submitted always equals
the number of eligible acres.
5)  Transactions costs from bidding are zero;  therefore, all eligible
landowners submit bids.
6)  Landowners solve identical maximization problems with utility
functions that are single-valued over income.  The form of the landowners'
problem is known by the government.
7)  Both landowners and the government are risk neutral.
258)  Fixed production costs and nonmarginal effects are ignored,  so that
private opportunity costs of land retirement are not affected by the
proportion of a farm's total area represented in a bid or by the total
acres enrolled within a local jurisdiction.
9)  All landowners know with certainty their own and only their own
reservation price, but believes that every other bidder's reservation
price is drawn independently from the same underlying distribution.
10)  The government does not know any individual reservation price, but
has the same belief about their underlying distribution as the landowners.
11)  All accepted bids are paid at their respective dollar/acre values.
The model requires that the government agency solve an optimization
problem,  given its  acreage goal and land eligibility criterion.  (With the
actual CRP, Congress established national acreage and other broad policy
parameters to be implemented by local agencies that,  so  far, have not had
direct budget constraints.)  The problem could be specified alternatively
as expenditure minimization subject to an acreage enrollment constraint,
or as enrollment maximization, subject to a budget constraint.  We choose
to specify the expenditure minimization problem for  two reasons.  One  is
that the current CRP has national acreage enrollment goals but no budget
constraint.  However,  this may not last;  reducing federal budget outlays
is a perennial policy objective.  The other reason is  that this
specification is more amenable to comparison with existing bidding models
that focus on expected revenues  (here outlays).  Specifying the
government's problem as one of acreage maximization would yield symmetric
results.
After receiving a set of bids, the government mechanically follows
previously established and announced bid selection rules.  Its problem can
be expressed according to ex ante expectations of landowner response to
those rules.  Thus, the government's problem is:




EXi - A  (2)
ii
where
i  - 1...I parcels  of eligible land.  There is one parcel per
agent.
E[BtDi] - expected equilibrium bid of agent i, given the bidding
mechanism established by the government  (discussed below).
X i - the government's decision rule  for bid acceptance. X  - 1
when BtDi is  accepted, and Xi - 0 when BID i is  rejected.
A - the government's  acreage enrollment goal.
Equation (2) is simply an equality constraint.  If EXi could be less
than A, the government could always minimize outlays by retiring only the
least expensive parcel.  On the other hand, if landowners know that more
than A acres may be accepted, then A would not serve as a binding
constraint to stimulate competitive bidding.  In this specification, the
local agency's ability to optimize before bids are received is  limited to
its discrete choice about the bidding procedure to be followed and
announced to  landowners.  Operationally, the agency merely accepts
received bids  in increasing dollars/acre order until A is  reached and
rejects the rest.
For their part, farmers seek to maximize expected utility, given that
the probability of any dollar/acre bid being accepted is determined by the
27announced bidding parameters.  Utility Ui is assumed to be concave and
continuously differentiable.  Each landowner's problem is:
Max  E[U ] -
BIDi
U(BIDi)*Pr[BIDi  accepted]  + U(RPi)*Pr[BIDi rejected]  (3)
where
Pr[BIDi accepted]  - 1 - Pr[BIDi rejected] - Pr[Xi - 1 |  BIDi]
In the Appendix, we derive results for the landowner's problem based
on similar models in the bidding literature  (Harris and Raviv, 1981;
McAfee and McMillan, 1987;  and Holt, 1980).  These results give rise to
several insights  from this simple model.
First,  a Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, initially only assumed to
occur,  does  indeed result from each landowner solving her respective
problem.  Define BIDi - BID(RPi)  as the  symmetric Nash equilibrium bid.
For each participant, BIDi maximizes expected utility when her true
reservation price is RPi,  given that each other bidder is using the same
strategy.  No bidder has an incentive to  deviate from this strategy,  given
that all  others follow it.
Second, under these conditions,  equilibrium bids strictly exceed
associated reservation prices along a range in which landowners believe
there is positive probability that all RPi are located.  Thus,  in this
model with competition, the government can not avoid paying something more
than true reservation prices  to retire land.  In particular,  the
government's expected total outlays (before bids are received) are A *
E[RP  A+], where the term in brackets  is  the reservation price associated
with the lowest rejected bid.
28Third,  the values for I and A  (while exogenously determined)  affect
equilibrium bidding strategies  and, hence,  expected government payments
per acre.  The probability that landowners assign to bid acceptance
decreases as competition (I - A) increases,  all else equal  (including the
underlying distribution of reservation prices).  This  is because, with
more bids to be submitted over  the same reservation price distribution,
there is  a smaller expected dollar/acre interval between the reservation
price associated with the Ath ordered bid (accepted) and the A+lth bid
(rejected).  In the next section, we discuss endogenizing I and A.
Fourth, bidders owning parcels  that have relatively high reservation
prices are effectively forced to bid at  levels not much greater than their
reservation prices.  That is,  if a reservation price is  close to  the high
end of the distribution, the associated equilibrium bid becomes  squeezed
close to that reservation price.
In the context of the hypothetical relationship between ordered
reservation prices and the offer curve shown in Figure 1, the modeled
relationship between ordered reservation prices and the offer curve from
equilibrium bids looks something like that shown in Figure 3.  The
difference between bids and their respective ordered reservation prices is
relatively large when reservation prices approach their lower bound (m),
while bids converge to reservation prices at their upper bound (n).  These
results indicate that a model with competitive bidding does increase cost
effectiveness;  however,  it does not result in accepted bids paid at their
reservation prices.
29Figure 3:  Hypothetical Relationship Between Ordered
Equilibrium Bids and Reservation Prices
When Government Sets an Acreage Constraint
ACRE  n  _  _  _  _  ...  . ......-. I  .. '
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Bids  ~  Reservation




30VII. Variations on the Basic Model
In this section, we discuss the  implications of relaxing or varying
several of the conditions  initially assumed for the above model.  While
formal derivations are beyond the scope of the present paper, we apply
results from similar models in the literature to conjecture on the
implications  for the basic model.  The order in which assumptions are
discussed is  arbitrary; unless stated otherwise,  the effects of relaxing
different assumptions are  independent of each other.
Relaxing the assumption that I and A are both exogenously chosen
would give  the government choice variables to affect bidding behavior.  As
shown in the Appendix,  the equilibrium bidding strategy is  affected by I -
A.  The general result that intensifying competition induces equilibrium
bids  to converge  toward reservation prices is  found in many auction models
(Wilson,  1977).
Suppose  that, under some alternative definition of parcel
eligibility, there are H eligible parcels, where H > I.  The number of
parcels  to be enrolled, A, is held constant to meet mandated national
acreage enrollment goals.  Then expected total government outlays for
enrolling A acres are  less than under the original eligibility definition,
all else equal  (As discussed below,  all else may not be equal.).
Alternatively, the number of eligible acres could be held constant at I,
while a smaller number of acres to be accepted is  announced, generating a
lower offer curve.  This,  of course,  would lower total social benefits
since  fewer acres are  retired.
The government's problem changes substantially if the assumption of
constant social benefits from land retirement  (all eligible parcels are
31equally desirable)  is relaxed.  Marginal social benefits from land
retirement may vary because of physical heterogeneity or because of
declining marginal utility for acreage retired.  The current CRP does not
distinguish among eligible parcels'  individual social benefits in bid
selection or payment amount,  despite evidence that the various
environmental services resulting from land retirement are function of
parcels' heterogenous physical characteristics  (Kozloff, 1990;  Kozloff and
Taff,  1990).  Some of these environmental services,  such as wildlife
habitat expansion and water quality improvement,  may be subject to
declining marginal utility as  retired acreage increases.
Regardless of whether marginal social benefits  decline because of
declining marginal utility or physical heterogeneity,  the government's
earlier problem may be respecified, for example,  as minimizing total
outlays subject  to achieving some level of social benefits  (EXi*SBi).  If
eligible parcels are relatively homogeneous,  increasing the number of
eligible parcels/bidders (I)  will tend to decrease government payments
without affecting total social benefits  realized from retiring A acres.
If, however,  declining marginal benefits  are due  to physical
heterogeneity, then relaxing the eligibility criterion also reduces  the
average social benefit from accepted bids.
Under these conditions and assuming the government knows  SBi,  it
faces a trade-off in defining parcel eligibility:  Increasing I tends to
reduce both government payments and social benefits from accepted bids.
While the potential sensitivity of total social benefits to alternative
land eligibility criteria was debated during the CRP's statutory
32development,  this trade-off arises only because of the competitive nature
of the bidding mechanism.
The assumption that bids are paid at  their face value may also be
relaxed since the government could adopt and announce some other award
procedure for paying accepted bids.  The above model is  an example of what
is called a "discriminating" auction:  accepted bids are paid at their
respective dollar/acre  levels.  In a "competitive" auction, on the other
hand, all bids are paid at the lowest rejected bid.  In a discriminating
auction, therefore,  each bidder faces uncertainty about bid acceptance,
but not about payment if the bid is accepted.  In a competitive auction,
however,  the bidder faces uncertainty about both bid acceptance and
ultimate payment.
While it might seem that the government's expected total outlays
would be greater under competitive  auction models, they are the same when
bidders are risk neutral as  assumed above  (Weber, 1983;  Harris and Raviv,
1981;  Smith,  1966;  Holt, 1980).  Intuitively, incentives  for bidder
behavior are different under the  two auction types.  In a competitive
auction,  a bidder knows that bidding higher than his reservation price
reduces  the probability that the bid will be accepted, even though the
price at which the contract  is written  (the lowest rejected bid) is
unchanged.  In this situation,  the Nash equilibrium strategy is  BID t -
RPi . Thus,  the mean bid accepted is  lower than with the discriminating
auction,  even though total outlays are the same.
This result changes when the risk neutrality assumption is  relaxed.
When bidders  are assumed to be risk averse, competitive auction models
33yield lower expected outlays than discriminating models  (Weber; Harris
and Raviv).
Relaxing the single bidding round assumption would cause the  one
period problems  of farmers and the government modeled earlier to both
become adaptive control problems.  As Reichelderfer (1986) notes:
The observed decisions by each  [bidder],  in a given time period,
will be used as a basis for  the succeeding time period's
critical decisions.  As the government and farmers gain better
and better knowledge of each other's behavior over time,  one
might expect a cobweb configuration of decisionmaking to
converge on an optimal level of CRP participation that satisfies
the objectives  of each set of decisionmakers,  as  constrained by
the other's agenda.  This, however, presumes  that objectives do
not vary over time  and that observed decisions are accurate
indicators  of behavioral motivation.
The bidders'  problem now becomes one of maximizing expected utility
associated with the discounted present value of a stream of income  from
either government payments or continued cropping at reservation prices.
Because they can observe bids submitted in previous rounds, bidders  can
update their beliefs about the distribution of other bidders' reservation
prices, which in turn allows them to adjust probabilities over bid
acceptance.  At the same time,  the payoff from bid rejection is no longer
simply measured by reservation price but rather by the expected present
value of reservation price for one or more periods plus  an accepted bid in
some subsequent period.  By bidding high, bidders stand to  gain over the
entire life of the contract, while, by bidding low,  they increase  the
probability of near term bid acceptance.  The time stream of payoffs  from
submitting an accepted bid in a given round (10 years under the current
CRP)  is  longer than the stream from bid rejection, since a rejected bidder
can bid in a subsequent round.  Discounting obviously plays an important
role in the formation of optimal bids.
34The government also solves a more complicated problem.  If the
announced acreage enrollment goal in any given round is relatively high,
the government  locks  itself into a ten year stream of payments  on
relatively high bid prices.  If the acreage goal is  set low, the
government foregoes social benefits  from not retiring certain parcels,  at
least until the next bidding round.  However, waiting to retire a parcel
in a subsequent round lowers the present value of government outlays.
Thus, updating information about reservation prices from observing
previously submitted bids may help the  government establish bidding
parameters  in subsequent rounds.
VIII. Policy Implications for the Current CRP
The previous discussion has been based on a land retirement program
that does not currently exist.  In implementing it,  the government seeks
to  solve an optimization problem.  While the discussion may be applicable
to future land management programs,  such as the wetland reserve program
contemplated in the  1990 federal farm bill,  it doesn't necessarily apply
to modification of an existing program like the CRP.
As of this writing (October, 1990),  the original CRP has been
extended with expanded land eligibility provisions for additional acreage
enrollment.  In this section, we adapt previous  findings to suggest some
improvements over the CRP's current bidding mechanism.  Recall that
farmers in each pool know their respective MARRs from observing previous
rounds' outcomes;  there are no budget or acreage constraints  (except in
those counties where the 25% county acreage limit is binding,  in which
case there is  no more CRP entry);  and there are multiple bidding periods
35whose remaining number is not known to potential bidders.  Because
landowners expect continuation of the current bidding mechanism and
possess the above  information,  it is more difficult to make
recommendations that fulfill both cost effectiveness and political
feasibility criteria than it would be to make such recommendations  for a
new program.  For example,  future participants may so  resent modification
of the current bidding mechanism that they refuse to bid.
In making these recommendations,  potential savings in government
outlays should not be overstated.  Potential savings are those measured by
the difference  in true reservation price  and paying everyone at the MARR.
This potential is  analogous  to the difference in outlays shown in Figure
1.  Only some fraction of these savings are achievable by most bidding
schemes.  Too, the present CRP is already achieving a (small) portion of
these savings,  as discussed in Section II.  Finally,  only a portion of the
estimated savings will actually be realized, given the necessary
compromises made in program administration and the certain deviation
between modeled and actual behavior of landowners.
These caveats notwithstanding,  changes in the CRP's current bidding
mechanism should be directed toward increasing competition:  Potential
bidders must be given information that causes them to  assign a positive
probability to bid rejection that increases as the bid's per acre value
increases.  Limiting either expenditures  or acreage within a given
jurisdiction and bidding round, coupled with enrolling bids in order of
lowest to highest per acre value  (as is nominally true in the current
program),  may achieve this reassignment of probabilities.  This  general
36prescription appears robust even if several simplifying assumptions are
relaxed.
While the specifics of an improved bidding mechanism are yet to be
determined, it may have some of the following features.  In the current
CRP, not all eligible bidders are observed to  actually bid in a given
round,  for reasons such as  lack of information,  the opportunity to
increase expected utility through Bayesian learning, high transactions
costs,  or certain knowledge that reservation price exceeds the bid cap.
This complicates the government's problem relative to  our model.  To
generate competitive behavior, the government wants the number of bidders
to exceed the acreage goal,  but if that  is  set too low, environmental
objectives may not be achieved.
The government can influence  the number of actual bidders  to  some
extent.  Public information provided prior to bidding may change the
perception of opportunity costs of participating (Baron).  For example,
expectation of lower crop prices (influenced by other government programs)
may increase  the number of bidders and decrease bid levels, because
reservation prices would be lower.
With several remaining rounds of bidding,  acreage enrollments  could
be set to induce competition within a given bidding round.  Then
successive bidding rounds could be held until a long term acreage goal  is
met.  If the optimization problem facing the government is  the dual of the
one presented in Section VI,  then inducing competition by limiting the
budget would be analogous to  this feature.  Here,  the government would
announce that bids would be accepted from lowest reservation price until
an announced budget constraint within that round is reached.
37While the discriminating auction model more closely resembles  the
manner in which the CRP was intended to operate than does the competitive
auction (which is more specific than the rubric  "competitive bidding"),
the outcome of the current process more resembles a competitive auction.
That is,  most payments made to successful bidders approximate the fixed
MARR.  This suggests that the uniform payments  (at the level of the lowest
rejected bid) of a competitive auction may have the advantage of perceived
equal treatment across landowners.  Implementing the CRP as a competitive
auction in this  sense may improve program cost effectiveness with
relatively little sacrifice of public acceptability.
Finally,  in conjunction with generating competitive behavior,  the
MARRs could be abolished.  While the MARRs now constrain the upper bound
at which bids  are paid,  they would not be binding if bidding were truly
competitive.  Without the MARRs,  the current bid pool regions would have
no purpose.  It must be  recognized, however,  that the MARRs and bid pools
also serve to spread land retirements among regions throughout the country
with disparate opportunity costs of retirement by imposing regional
ceilings on maximum acceptable bids.  There may be some social purpose
(other than income redistribution)  for limiting the competition for land
retirements  to relatively homogeneous regions.  If so,  this could still be
achieved by limiting bid submission and selection to landowners within the
jurisdiction of the county ASCS office.
IX. Research Directions
Under certain conditions,  appropriate changes  in the current CRP
bidding mechanism offer potentially significant savings in government
38outlays.  Before any such changes  are implemented,  more research is
advisable.  Theoretically optimal behavior is  rarely observed,  either in
experimental situations  or in actual program implementation.  Furthermore,
American farmers traditionally demonstrate great resourcefulness in
"farming the programs,"  finding ways  to maximize private gains  in the face
of often complex and restrictive program rules.  In solving their
individual optimization problems, farmers may unintentionally subvert the
public purposes associated with the programs.  Thus,  there is  a wide gap
between the ex ante cost effectiveness of program provisions and their ex
post realization.
For these reasons,  future  research on bidding mechanisms for land
retirement should employ both experimental and pilot study analyses of the
most theoretically promising mechanisms.  As Smith  (1976) notes,  "Perhaps
the most important ultimate value  [of experimental analysis]  is  to provide
rigorous  testing of our ability to model elementary behavior before
confronting such models with field data."  Experimental approaches  should
ideally draw from the population of potential participants  for sample
study groups.  Experiments can provide relatively inexpensive short term
answers to such questions as:
(1)  Are the models sufficiently straightforward that subjects are able
to make consistent decisions based on underlying behavioral
incentives?
(2)  Are the behavioral incentives predicted by the models reasonable
reflections of how program participants behave when faced with
simulated choices?
(3)  Do  the models appear robust with respect to minor deviations in
parameters?
39While experiments may prove valuable  in addressing such questions,
they are still a step removed from real landowner responses  to  real
program offerings.  Bidders may respond differently to economic
transactions of magnitudes  comparable to  those  experienced with the CRP
than those typically used in experimental situations.  In addition, actual
program implementation is  rarely as  controlled as the protocol of an
experiment.  For these reasons, pilot studies of those models that appear
most promising from an experimental perspective would be useful to address
questions of administrative feasibility as well as  participant responses
to  derive more realistic estimates of program cost effectiveness.  In
addition, pilot studies would allow estimation of transaction costs
associated with alternative schemes.  Finally,  such studies would indicate
political and psychological acceptability of the government's desired
outcome of filling bids at heterogeneous dollar per acre values.
Regardless of the choice of particular research agenda,  the large
budget commitment associated with present land retirement programs and the
demonstrated potential gains from competitive bidding both suggest that
more cost-effectiveness research be conducted before new programs are
initiated.
40APPENDIX
In Section VII, we present a model in which total government outlays
A
are the sum of a set of Nash equilibrium bids BIDi.  Here, we derive an
A
expression for BID,. To simplify notation,  let BIDi - bi and,  to reflect
that reservation prices are independent random variables,  let RPi - Oi,  so
BIDi - b(Di).  We restate or assume the following conditions:
1.  There are I eligible parcels.
2.  The government wants  to retire A parcels, where A < I.
3.  a) Each landowner i - 1 ,...  I has one eligible parcel whose
reservation price 8i  is known with certainty by i but not by other
landowners.
b) Landowners believe that rival's reservation prices are drawn from
the same distribution:  p.d.f. g(.)  and c.d.f. G(.).  Assume g(.)  >
0 on some finite interval  (m, n).
4.  Each landowner submits bid bi and believes  that each of the I - 1
rivals uses a differentiable and strictly increasing bidding
strategy  b]  - b(9j)  for 8je(m, n) j "  i.
5.  Each landowner is  risk neutral and has  the  same twice differentiable
utility function U(.),  where U(.)  is concave and U(0) - 0.  Further
restrict U to the case of U(x) - x;  i.e.,  U is  the identity.
6.  Define w(-)  as the inverse of the bidding strategy b(-),  so that
r[b(ej)]  - ej.
7.  Reservation prices for the I eligible parcels  are indexed so that 91
9e 2 S ... S eI. Define
e()...e(i ) to be the order statistics  of 9  ...  e1 .
418.  Define b(eA)  - bA as the Ath smallest bid among the  I-1 rival
bidders.
From the monotonicity of b(.),  the smallest rejected rival bid is
bA+l,  and i's bid  is accepted if bi <  b(  Then the probability that
b i will be accepted is equivalent to the probability that  r(bi)  is  less
than 8(A+l) (the A+lth order statistic from the I-1 reservation prices of
the rival bidders):
Pr[accept bi]  - Pr[bi <  bA+l]  (Al)
- Pr[r(bi) <  A+] - 1-F[w(bi)]  (A2)
where F[.]  is  an increasing function of b i and denotes the cumulative
distribution representing each landowner's prior beliefs  about  (A+l) 9
The  corresponding p.d.f.  is  f(.).
The  ith landowner's maximized expected utility can now be expressed
by substituting (A2) into equation  (3),  the original  landowner objective
function:
Max E[U]  - U(bi)(l-F[r(bi)]) +  U(Wi)F[7r(bi)]  (A3)
The  first order necessary condition for an optimal bid is
U'(bi)(l-F[r(bi)])  - [U(bi)  - U(ei)]f[x(bi)]r'(bt) - 0  (A4)
9From the properties  of order statistics,  if F[.]  is  the c.d.f.  of
e  -„  and x  is  the value of the reservation price of the ith parcel known
byAte  ith bidder,  then
F(x) - Pr[e(A+l)  x]
- Pr[at least A+l of the 8i are less  than or equal to x]
- [  ------  ! J  G(x)  [1-G(x)]-i
i-A  (I-A)!A!I
for all 8ie(m, n)  (David, 1970, p. 7).
42In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, all bidders  use the same strategy.
Therefore,  the inverse strategy function will be the  same ei - w(bi)  for
all  i - 1 ...  I.  Replacing w(bi) in  (A4) with ei gives
U'(bi)b'(ei)[1-F(ei)]  - [U(bi)  - U(ei)]f(e i )  - 0  (A5)
1
because  b'(ei) -
ir' (b(ei))
Because  of how U is  defined,1 (A5) can be rewritten as:
b'(ei)[1-F(et)]  - [b(e i )  - ei]f(ei)  - 0  (A6)
or
d
dei [(l-F(ei))b(ei)]  - -etf(e  )  (A7)
Solving for the optimal bid gives the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies
as  a function of ei:
Let  u - -x, dv - -f(x)dx, du - -dx, and v - 1 - F(x).  Integrating the
right side of (A8) by parts,  fudv - uv - jvdu,
n  n
b(  i)  F(  -X(1-F(x))  +  (1-F(x))dx
- e  +  f  (1-F(x))dx  (A9)
ee
Therefore,  b(e-)  >  -, and lim b(v.)  - n.  Since  b(e- )  i8  strictly
increasing between m and n  and  nis  bounded by n, it is  a  Nash equilibrium.
10See Holt (1980) for an alternative derivation that retains U.
43The right side of (A8) is  the payoff to i when equilibrium bids are
based on reservation price ei . Recall that f(.) is defined as  the p.d.f.
of eA+l  ei.  Then by the definition of the expectation of a conditional
value,
b(Oi) - E[eA+1 I|  <  A+1  (A10)
(A10) can be interpreted to  say that the equilibrium bidding strategy  is
equal to the expected value of  the reservation price associated with the
minimum rejected bid, conditional on eA+l > ei . Because  eA+1 > ei
implies  b(eA+l) > b(ei),  i's payoff, evaluated at  i's equilibrium bid, is
equal to the expected value of the lowest rejected reservation price,
given that i's bid is  accepted (Holt, 1980).
Equation (A10) also gives rise  to the equivalence in total expected
government outlays between discriminating and competitive auction models
as  discussed in Section VII.  Expected outlays under both models are
A*E[e(A+I)]  (Weber, 1983;  Harris  and Raviv, 1981).
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